In the post-Cold War era, the number of ongoing civil wars has drastically increased. While the number of casualties in civil wars has been downward trending, the magnitude and length of these conflicts are spiraling out of control. Transnational conflicts in the Sahel, Central Africa, and the Middle East are threatening major population and economic centers and potentially disrupting the world order.

Managing these conflicts, in itself, is a highly intricate, ever-changing practice. There is no particular universal prescription for how to deal with these conflicts; instead, policies should be tailored towards each specific case. Many third parties that intervene will erroneously implement policy prescriptions that worked in a previous case, but may not be beneficial for the case at hand. 

Perhaps one of the most prominent non-militant tactics used to resolve conflicts is the implementation of power-sharing agreements. Power sharing assures that all aggrieved parties may receive some portion of the total spoils of war. For example, the Good Friday Agreement (1998) allowed the Northern Irish to retain autonomy over the Eastern two-thirds of Ulster, while the Irish retained the rest of the island. This agreement led to a cease-fire of hostilities, ending an almost three-decade-long civil war. 

Moreover, consociationalism, a form of power sharing, was utilized in Lebanon as a way to mitigate internal conflicts due to the country’s diverse population. The 1975 Peace Agreement instituted quotas for the number of seats given to each of the country’s primary social groups: the Maronite Christians, Shia Muslims, Sunni Muslims, and Druze. While in theory, this seems to be an equitable solution, in practice, fighting continued in the Levantine country for a continued 15 years post settlement, due to underlying social tensions. This thereby demonstrates that power-sharing solutions aren’t necessarily optimal for every case to which they’re applied.

While I have now examined examples of both successful and unsuccessful implementations of power-sharing agreements, a third category arises. These are agreements that were successful in the short run, but fell apart in the long run due to significant underlying societal tensions, changing power dynamics, or a lack of robust enforcement. One of the most prominent examples of this is Tajikistan. 

An often forgotten former Soviet Republic located almost entirely within the Pamir Mountains of Central Asia, Tajikistan is quite a fascinating case. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, Tajikistan faced a plethora of issues, including economic hardship, a diverse population wanting representation in new government institutions, and underdeveloped infrastructure. 

Only two months after leaving the Soviet Union, Tajikistan held its first presidential election on November 24, 1991, which resulted in Communist Party candidate Rahmon Nabiyev winning, being the recipient of 60% of the votes. This was opposed by a large majority of Tajiks, as waves of nationalism had recently been spreading throughout the country, in response to perceived deprivation at the hands of the Soviets. In early 1992, protests against the election results broke out, although initially non-violent, they soon escalated, resulting in protester-police clashes in Khujand, the second-largest city in Tajikistan. Eventually, in September of 1992, the protesters captured Nabiyev and forced him to resign, ushering in a presidential power vacuum that would be filled by Emomali Rhamon, the president of Tajikistan to this day.

A five-year civil war, with control of the government at stake, ensued. The conflict itself is considered by many scholars to be an ideological clash between the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), liberal reformists, and Islamists who were concentrated in Southern and Eastern regions, and the Communist government, made up of elites from the North and central capital regions. In late 1992, Rahmon’s government requested that Russia send in troops to help squash the rebellion; however, in many ways, this backfired. The Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) divisions committed numerous atrocities against civilians, further enraging the public. This led to more fighters joining the UTO, ultimately prolonging the war. Pro-government fighters committed atrocities across the country, including a massacre of 71 civilians, including children, in the village of Sumbulak. Overall, an estimated 35,000-157,000 people were killed, 600,000 fled to neighboring Afghanistan, and a further 1.6 million were internally displaced. 

Although official peace talks, mediated by a council of Russia, the CIS, and the UN, were initiated in 1994, the UTO only days after reaching the negotiation table, ensued and even escalated their fighting in a blatant attempt to increase their bargaining power. Although logical, it is quite erroneous to assume that once two opposing sides reach negotiations, with the presence of a mediator, they will cease fighting. This sunk-cost signal will thereby confirm to the opposing party that their negotiations are honest and that they truly want to reach an agreement. However, complete trust in an adversary, resulting in both parties willingly laying down their arms,  is nearly impossible to achieve. Within this scenario exists a prominent security dilemma. The security dilemma is a concept in which two opposing entities can never be certain of their security in the presence of the other, and thereby they both look to maximize their defenses. However, this defensive action can easily be misconstrued as a potential offensive attack, thereby creating a feedback loop of increased distrust and armament between both entities. 

In the case of Tajikistan, like essentially every other civil war that has occurred, there existed a prominent security dilemma. So, how may we mitigate this dilemma, thereby paving the way towards successful negotiations in which neither party will renege?

Well, according to political scientist Barbara F. Walter, this can be achieved through the implementation of security guarantees. These are tactics that can be instituted to both drastically reduce the existence of a security dilemma, while also preparing for the successful implementation of power-sharing agreements in the future. These guarantees include the presence of relatively strong third-party guarantors, institutional power-sharing features, and integration of armed forces. Although Walter’s theory wasn’t published until 1999, the framework for the Tajik Civil War power-sharing negotiations was performed in congruence with the theory. 

On June 27, 1997, a peace agreement was reached between Rhamon’s government and the UTO, officially terminating the five-year-long conflict. The agreement is perhaps a paragon of power-sharing, containing three primary stipulations. The first of which granted UTO a minimum quota of 30% of all parliamentary seats, while further legalizing political parties and freedom of speech. Secondly, the agreement gave UTO leader Otokhan Latifi the authority to create the Central Electoral Commission and oversee new electoral laws to guarantee the implementation of fair and competitive elections. Third, there would be a gradual integration of UTO forces into the national military; the graduality of this step is of paramount importance, as it decreases the presence of a security dilemma if both sides still maintain some degree of fighting capabilities until complete integration is guaranteed. Lastly, in accordance with Walter’s theory, the peace agreement’s installation was to be overseen by the United Nations Mission Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), while Russian and some CIS troops still would be stationed in the country as mutual observers to deter further fighting. 

At first glance, this all seems to be an ideal situation of power sharing. The security dilemma is reduced with the presence of UNMOT and Russia, and both sides laying down arms to integrate into a joint military. Moreover, there are genuine power-sharing institutions that were installed to guarantee government representation from both parties. In fact, many prominent scholars on the Tajik peace process consider the agreement’s implementation a success, as the conflict has not restarted even after almost three decades.

However, I argue that the 1997 Peace Agreement was a complete failure, which has only further divided Tajik society and consolidated power in the hands of Emomali Rahmon’s government coalition. The simple cessation of fighting doesn’t necessarily yield a positive outcome 100% of the time; in fact, most of the work is performed post-agreement, in making sure its stipulations are not only implemented, but also institutionalized and able to be robust and prosper in the long run. This is where the 1997 Peace agreement falters. 

The primary support for my argument is the erosion of democratic principles guaranteed by the peace agreement, including reneging on the process of free and fair elections. Within the first few years after the agreement was reached, Rahmon targeted his political opponents, unfairly branding them as “jihadist extremists,” and further plotted assassinations against former UTO officials. Most notably, in September 1998, Rahmon hired an assassin to kill Otokhan Latifi, the head of the central election committee, outside of his apartment in Dushanbe. 

Rahmon further consolidated power via a constitutional referendum in 1999, which abolished term limits for the presidency. This new clause, combined with an absence of institutions to guarantee free and fair elections, has led to Rahmon winning every election since in a “landslide.” Election fraud is rampant in Tajikistan, with many numerical discrepancies in the reported figures, and general pressure placed on citizens to vote for Rahmon’s People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT).

Moreover, Rahmon has been able to consolidate the legislative branch under PDPT control. After the Tajik parliamentary elections on March 2, 2025, the party controlled 49 of the 63 seats in the lower house, undeniably giving them a supermajority. 

Lastly, the judiciary, although intended to be independent, is in practice under the direct influence of Rahmon and the PDPT. The International Court of Justice reports that “[s]elf-governing bodies of the judiciary are weak and individual judges remain highly vulnerable to pressures from within or outside the judiciary.” The erosion of democratic institutions, although not re-igniting full-scale fighting, has led to an unstable governmental system that puts its citizens at immense risk. Freedom House’s Global Freedom Score, a metric intended to determine citizens’ access to civil liberties, political rights, and individual freedoms, lists Tajikistan at a 5/100, behind authoritarian countries such as Libya, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

The failures of the 1997 Peace Agreement extend well beyond the political sphere, further destabilizing economic security within Tajikistan. Tajikistan is the poorest of all the former Soviet Republics. While the post-settlement period saw macroeconomic stability, at an everyday macroeconomic level, a large portion of the population suffered. As of 2022, the annual income in Tajikistan is a mere $864 USD per household, and one-in-three children live in severe food poverty. 

The geography of Tajikistan also hinders its economic progress, as 93% of Tajikistan’s territory is over 1,000 feet above sea level, and of 50% is above 10,000 feet, making it one of the most mountainous countries in the world. Because of these high elevations, combined with poor infrastructural networks, many portions of the country remain inaccessible via land routes, and flights remain too expensive for the majority of Tajiks. Because peripheral regions, such as Gorno Badakhshan, an autonomous province in Eastern Tajikistan, are separated by these harsh geographic barriers, the central government in Dushanbe has developed a practice of neglect by the central government. 

Another indicator of the 1997 Peace Agreement’s failure was the lack of robust security guarantors, in terms of third-party mediators. The two primary mediators that I focus on are Russia and the aforementioned UNMOT. Russia fell short as a successful guarantor of safety due to the fact that it was not truly interested in preserving peace within Tajikistan, but rather in stabilizing regions in its periphery. It is evident that the Russians are only interested in containing a potential conflict spill-over. As of 2022, Russia had an estimated 7,000 armed forces stationed in Tajikistan; however, their role and effectiveness have been minimal. If anything, these troops are further solidifying Rhamon’s oppressive regime, which has been deemed the most stable political option by Moscow. 

Moreover, UNMOT, along with the OSCE, oversaw Tajik elections from 1997 to 2000, to confirm a multi-party, fair, governmental transition. Unfortunately, the observers erroneously claimed that these elections were successful in terms of being both democratic and multi-partisan. This claim is quite ridiculous from an official UN statement, in which they also acknowledged “weaknesses in legislation, minimum levels of transparency [and] a high rate of proxy voting.” Despite these evident signs of democratic weakness, in May 2000, UNMOT decided its work was done, thereby exiting Tajikistan. Subsequently, the democratic systems in Tajikistan, which were already fragile, were now shattered. 

Once again, while the agreement was successful in stopping future fighting, it fell short in the areas of democratic power sharing. So this now poses a question: was the 1997 Agreement successful?

This is quite a difficult question, and your answer depends on your own beliefs about the philosophy behind nation-states. Is an authoritarian state an appropriate means to achieve a peaceful end goal? 

Tajikistan provides a great example of the inherent complexities of negotiating peace agreements and the implementation of power-sharing institutions. Barbara F. Walter theorizes that slow, gradual democratization processes may be more successful than initial implementation right after a peace agreement is reached. Perhaps if these processes were implemented in Tajikistan, we would see a new figure in the executive and increased plurality in the legislature. 

When addressing ongoing civil wars, such as those in Sudan, Yemen, and Afghanistan, one should be wary of applying universal prescriptions or copying the processes put in place to resolve other conflicts. However, the case of power-sharing in Tajikistan, whether considered a success or failure, can be a valuable case for contemporary conflict negotiators.