This past summer, I had the opportunity to solo travel to Taipei, the bustling capital of Taiwan. While I was there, you could hardly tell that this vibrant city was the capital of a nation under constant threat of annihilation. Yet, there were signs. Whether it was the thick blast doors at the entrance of the metro system, signs pointing to an air raid shelter, fighter jets occasionally streaking overhead, or the TV news in a quaint noodle shop reporting on PRC naval exercises, the unspoken war between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) lurked wherever I traveled. Since 1949, the constant threats of invasion from the PRC have become all too familiar to the island nation, which has spent its entire existence preparing for such a contingency. For decades, Taiwan has been able to rely on the deterrence provided by its uniquely robust semiconductor industry, a so-called “silicon shield” that has provided soft power to deter the PRC. It has also been safe and repeatedly assured that the United States would come to its aid. However, the geopolitical reality surrounding these two factors has shifted, and the capability of Taiwan to defend itself is in question unless it adapts to rapidly changing circumstances.

A Fortress of Geography and Geopolitics

China would need to overcome a multitude of obstacles to successfully launch an invasion of Taiwan. A treacherous monsoon season means that the Taiwan Strait is crossable for only a few months out of the year, and an amphibious operation would require greater dedication of manpower and resources than D-Day. Furthermore, as evidenced by the long and conspicuous Russian mobilization leading up to the invasion of Ukraine, it would be nearly impossible for the Chinese military to conceal a large buildup. Steep mountains cover approximately two-thirds of the island. Indeed, the geography of the island lends itself heavily to the defenders. In addition, the eastern side of the island is dominated by sheer cliffs, while the western side, which faces the mainland, is surrounded by shallow water, making it difficult for larger ships to navigate. Once on land, invading forces would need to contend with choke points formed by the mountain ranges. Then urban warfare, which has proved so bloody in Ukraine, would ensue. China would be racing against time to pacify the island before aid from the United States and other allies in the region arrived. Taiwan has spent its entire existence preparing for this exact contingency, and President Biden has previously stated that he would deploy U.S. troops to defend the island nation. For decades, the consensus has been that these factors make any invasion far too costly for China to undertake. 

The factors listed above are not impossible to overcome for a nation like China, which has dedicated every year since 1949 to preparing for an invasion. However, the fact of the matter is that the Taiwanese military is simply too small to be able to hold off an invasion indefinitely. The Chinese military outnumbers the Taiwanese military nearly 13:1 and has far more artillery, tanks, and aircraft. The consensus on the Taiwanese defense strategy is that Taiwanese forces must delay Chinese advances until the United States and its allies can arrive. That the U.S. will come to the aid of Taiwan has been an almost forgone conclusion in the minds of many military analysts. It is something that a decade ago would have been unquestionable. Yet, the United States has no formal, binding commitment to Taiwan. Thus, in a new geopolitical reality in the Pacific and a new domestic environment in the United States, this is far from assured.

The Past is No Longer an Indication of the Future

The fall of mainland China in 1949 shocked the United States, which provided Taiwan with billions in economic and military aid over the course of the Cold War as part of its policy of containment. In addition, the United States lent direct military support to Taiwan on no fewer than three occasions during the Taiwan Strait Crises against the PRC, during which the U.S. sent warships, aircrafts, and military personnel to the island. These interventions took place in an era when the U.S. could be assured that wherever it deployed its forces in the Pacific, whether in Korea, Vietnam, or the Taiwan Straits, it had superior technology and firepower. However, since the end of the Cold War, the balance of power in the Pacific has dramatically shifted. China has undertaken a rapid modernization and armament program to prepare for a potential invasion of Taiwan. The Office of Naval Intelligence noted that the Chinese Navy (PLAN) is now numerically superior to the U.S. Navy and that Chinese shipyards are far larger and more productive than their American counterparts. This is especially concerning given that in the peacetime status quo, the U.S. Navy is struggling with a significant backlog of ships requiring maintenance. In the case of a conflict spanning more than a few weeks, the U.S. would simply not have the shipbuilding capacity to repair damaged ships and build replacements simultaneously. These factors do not necessarily mean that the PRC would win a conflict in the Pacific, but it does mean that the United States can no longer operate with the impunity it once did. Taiwan cannot assume that even if the U.S. decides to come to its aid, it will result in victory. Indeed, it means the decision to deploy U.S. assets in the region to defend Taiwan requires deliberation.

Trumpian Unpredictability

The outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election has serious implications for Taiwan’s security. Trump’s transactional view of American foreign policy and his increasingly isolationist rhetoric are highly concerning for the status of U.S. aid to Taiwan. In a July 2024 interview, Trump repeatedly expressed doubt about the U.S. capability to defend Taiwan and blamed it for undermining the U.S. semiconductor industry. Such thinking is in line with Trump’s philosophy on aid to other countries fighting their own struggles for freedom, such as Ukraine. He proposes that any American aid should be given transactionally, where the United States (or Trump himself) receives something tangible in return. Given that Trump is dismissive of aiding a state engaged in an existential struggle against a great power, he is unlikely to think differently about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Should China believe Trump is averse to defending Taiwan, it could lead to intensified military and diplomatic pressure campaigns. 

The Erosion of Taiwan’s Silicon Shield

For decades, the dominance of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company as a source for the overwhelming majority of the global supply of chips has given Taiwan a strategic significance that it has leveraged to garner international support for its defense. Taiwanese chip foundries produce 60 percent of the world’s semiconductors and 92 percent of the most modern microchips. A State Department study found that a disruption of the Taiwanese chip industry through a Chinese blockade would entail an astonishing 2.5 trillion dollars in annual economic losses to the global economy. However, this “silicon shield” and the potential economic shock from a conflict in Taiwan is a major factor in why the U.S. passed the 2022 bipartisan CHIPS Act. The act included billions in federal subsidies for building microchip manufacturing in the U.S. and a new set of export controls to keep advanced microchips away from China, insulating the American economy in the case of a conflict in Taiwan. The U.S. has clearly been attempting to ease its reliance on Taiwan’s semiconductor industry by strengthening its own. The construction of such a manufacturing base may prove lucrative for TSMC in the short term. Still, such protectionist legislation in the U.S. and other countries fundamentally undermines Taiwan’s strategic protection garnered from its semiconductor industry.

Conclusion

Taiwan stands at a critical juncture where its future as a self-governed democracy is increasingly uncertain. While its geography, military preparedness, and alliances have historically served as strong deterrents against Chinese aggression, shifting geopolitical realities—like China’s military modernization, U.S. domestic politics, and the erosion of Taiwan’s “silicon shield”—now call those protections into question. Taiwan’s path forward will likely require a combination of heightened self-reliance, diplomatic agility, and innovative defense strategies to navigate the evolving threats to its sovereignty. The government must recognize the reality of the situation. Taiwan is not doomed in any sense of the word – the geographic and tactical challenges laid out at the beginning of this article are still very much present. If Taiwan plays its strategic strengths shrewdly, as they have since the nation was established in 1949, they will be fine. Potential solutions include attempting to diversify Taiwanese industry into other tech sectors, strengthening ties with other Asian nations that were antagonized by China, or bargaining with President Trump to secure American assurances. Whatever they do, the first step to taking adequate steps is recognizing this new reality.