Neorealism: Born from Anarchy

“Of mankind we may say in general they are fickle, hypocritical, and greedy for gain.” 

(Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince)

The end of WWII ushered in a new era of great power politics and ways of thinking about international relations. Theorists’ interpretations of the international system as an arena of cooperation and mutual dependence were squashed by the failed League of Nations and the rise of fascist revisionist states across the globe. Idealists, as these theorists were termed, were left with no ground on which to support the international institutions they upheld prior to the war. The international system had never seemed as anarchic as it did in the early years of the post-war period. Continents were decimated, infrastructure collapsed, and great power rivalries grew, creating a treacherous new international ecosystem for humanity to navigate. 

It was now up to a new class of theorists, who saw the future for humanity and mutual cooperation as depressingly bleak, to develop the roadmap for navigating the new post-war international system. Drawing from Machiavellian principles on human nature, the prominent strand of IR theorists, known as Realists, saw the states and the system as defined by the ill qualities of humanity. Humans were rational, self-interested actors; therefore, states, composed of humans, were too. Moreover, these theorists defined the international system as anarchic because there was no overarching authoritative body that could keep the independent actors (states) in check. 

Hans Morgenthau, a prominent realist during the postwar era, claimed that the constant human desire for power was the cause of conflict. During this period of history, the gears of the international system were rapidly shifting, pushing this pessimistic view to become the dominant strain of thought among Morgenthau’s contemporaries.

A few decades later, IR theorist Kenneth Waltz spearheaded the creation of a new strain of Realist thought: Neorealism (or Structural Realism). He posited that international relations could be thoroughly studied by looking at the structure of the international system. According to neorealists, the international system is defined by its polarity, or the number of great powers operating within said system. Neorealists further agree that the specific degree of polarity within the system directly affects the stability of the international system. 

In the eyes of Neorealists, a bipolar world with two dominant state actors would yield the most stable world order. According to the theory, the two great powers would keep each other in check while also having to cater to the needs of other states in the international system to garner support. Even though the Soviet Union and the United States. were adversarial in the post-war period, they were able to create a stable world order through power balancing. 

Power balancing is a fundamental concept of Realism, which views the world in terms of relative gains. When maximizing their military or economic capabilities, states focus on the capabilities of other states. If a state isn’t focused on the gains of its adversaries, it may find itself in an adverse position which renders its sovereignty or prosperity in the international system insecure. Therefore, states adjust their own capabilities in an attempt to keep up with their adversaries.

Similar to classical realists, Waltz believed that above all else, states are rational, self-interested actors whose primary goal is to survive within the anarchic system. This has led to a security dilemma, in which states feel they must develop their military capabilities due to the looming possibility of various threats to their sovereignty. The security dilemma is the direct cause of nuclear arms races, like the races between the United States and the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan, or Iran and other Arab states. 

Strides Towards Nonproliferation and Subsequent Pitfalls

“As long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain some level of these weapons ourselves.”

(US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates)

The Cold War was a time of tension characterized by a constant, looming fear over the prospect of a nuclear weapon being deployed by either the United States or the Soviet Union. Soon enough, the Cold War arms race caused a spillover effect of nuclear weapons programs among other powerful states, namely, France, the United Kingdom, and China. It appeared for a while that the whole world was preparing to engage in a desperate nuclear arms race, precipitating a dog-eat-dog international system similar to the environment that preceded both World Wars. 

Fortunately, the international community looked to mitigate the spread of nuclear weapons with multilateral legislation, most notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 

The NPT separated signatories into two categories: nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). While the NWS committed to a progressive disarmament process, the NNWS agreed to refrain from developing any nuclear warheads. 

While this framework would be highly beneficial if every state signed on, a few key states, including Israel, India, and Pakistan, refused to sign the treaty. This ended up contributing to increased unknowns for states in terms of security, thereby increasing the uneasiness surrounding the security dilemma. 

For example, Israel’s adversaries in the Middle East felt they needed to develop their own nuclear weapons programs to counter those that Israel had newly acquired from the United States in response to the Six-Day War. Moreover, Pakistani-Indian relations have been hostile since the 1970s after the two states began developing nuclear weapons programs. It is no coincidence that the Kargil War—fought in 1999 between India and Pakistan– occurred only one year after Pakistan conducted its first nuclear warhead tests in Chagai.

Universal Armament: An Unexpected Solution

“Those who like peace should love nuclear weapons.”

(Kenneth Waltz)

While Nuclear Non-Proliferation is well-intentioned, and in theory could help guarantee a de-escalated international system, Neorealists treat the NPT as an act of naïve idealism. Proponents of non-proliferation view the world through an Idealist IR lens, examining how it should be instead of how it is. On the contrary, the world is once again anarchic and states are self-interested actors. Therefore, they will never become immune to the security dilemma. As long as there is even a remote possibility one other state may have nuclear weapons, it becomes necessary that another state have them; this is just the nature of the international system.

Kenneth Waltz believes in the power of the principle of mutually assured destruction. This theory posits that states avoid using nuclear weapons, since a nuclear attack by one superpower would be met with an equally devastating response, leaving both attacker and responder annihilated. In Waltz’s view, no rational actor would choose to use nuclear weapons against an adversary knowing that it is essentially suicidal. Therefore, if every state in the international system had nuclear weapons, they would be able to preemptively defend themselves against any future attack due to the deterring principle of mutually assured destruction. 

This whole concept may seem incredibly ridiculous, as we have been conditioned to believe that nuclear weapons are world-ending weapons that pose an impending threat to the existence of the human race. Now, people are saying that we should essentially hand out nuclear weapons to every state. It seems as if these theorists are completely detached from reality. 

Well, if we look at this issue through the Neorealist theoretical framework, it makes sense. The anarchic nature of the international system, as well as the self-interested and rational nature of states, has led to an inevitable security dilemma. In this instance, it is the uneven proliferation of nuclear warheads that has led to this insecurity. Therefore, the only way to keep states compliant is to balance out the number of nuclear warheads in the system. All states will then have the ability to focus less on nuclear and military capabilities and instead work towards economic, social, or political progress.

In this sense, the neorealist answer to nuclear deterrence is well-intended. 

A Naïve Strain of Thought

Simply put, Kenneth Waltz and other similar-thinking neorealist theorists are detached from society. They see the world in theoretical models of ‘polarity structures’ and ‘power balancing’. Moreover, they rely too heavily on the belief that all states are rational.

The fact is simple: humans are not always rational. This gross oversimplification of humanity depletes all credibility within the neorealist argument. For example, were the many genocides of the 20th century rational? Is the rogue state of North Korea rational? Irrationality is commonplace in international relations. Irrationality is a simple fact of humanity, and neorealists just want to sweep this matter under the rug. The human psyche must be privileged and valued for its variability and “defectiveness,” which is something neorealism fails to do.

I do concede that in theory, Mutually Assured Destruction works, as long as the retaliatory state can maintain its nuclear weapons. However, there are so many unknown variables. For example, if the initial strike targets these nuclear launch sites or disrupts communications in a state, then this retaliatory launch becomes much more difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, a state may choose not to retaliate with nuclear weapons, instead choosing a less costly outside option through negotiation or a full-fledged military campaign.

Furthermore, one may claim that this initial strike would break the nuclear taboo causing foreign intervention from international organizations (IOs), as well as general shaming of the perpetrator. However, the realist strain of thought disregards the influence of IOs and the sense of international shaming that stems from them. Instead, they see IOs as an extension of the great powers that established them. Therefore, in the eyes of neorealists, fundamental international organizations such as the UN are not robust enough, and therefore incapable of punishing states that break the nuclear taboo. 

Moreover, perhaps the most prominent argument against Waltz’s claims is the relevance of non-state actors in the system, particularly terrorist organizations. Realists disregard the significance of non-state actors in the international system, which leaves a gaping hole in their argument for nuclear power balancing. Perhaps every state in the system has equal nuclear capabilities, but there will always still be terrorist organizations that exist that can disrupt the international order. 

Many transnational militant groups such as ISIS are not bound to a particular state or region and are therefore not susceptible to the same fear of mutually assured destruction as a state would be. Like a parasite, they can quickly move capital, personnel, and resources to other states that act like hosts. A retaliatory attack is much harder to coordinate against a moving, transnational target. 

While there isn’t yet a terrorist organization that possesses nuclear capabilities, in a world where every nation has nuclear weapons, it will become much easier for terrorists to get a hold of them. 

On top of this, a universal balance of nuclear weapons doesn’t guarantee that the security dilemma will simply vanish. There will still be those who break international norms to develop higher quantities of and more advanced weapons than their adversaries. In the theoretical world of universal nuclear proliferation, it would be a matter of minutes before a state violates the international agreement and norms. The fact of the matter is that the security dilemma will continue to persist as long as humans exist; it’s simply our nature. 

While this Neorealist framework is theoretical, it has influenced states persons’ decision-making in the last few decades. While Waltz’s take on universal nuclear proliferation is a more extreme strand of the neorealist argument, this demonstrates how ridiculous and rigid the theory is. 

The Neorealist argument is parsimonious to a fault—it leaves no room for nuance. In my opinion, it is an outdated theory that must come to terms with the contemporary international system. Non-state actors will continue to persist. Humans will continue to vary in their thought process and some will be irrational. The state is not the end-all, be-all of international relations. As long as Waltz’s vision of universal proliferation disregards these integral factors of international relations, we can’t view this theory as any more than blind optimism. 

Closing Note: Even though I don’t agree with much of his philosophy, it shouldn’t be overlooked that Kenneth Waltz was an incredibly influential theorist and observer of international relations. The landscape of international relations would not look nearly the same if it wasn’t for his contributions. Thank you, Dr. Waltz.  

Thank you all for reading.