On October 25th, Colombian President Gustavo Petro traveled to Beijing for the first time to hold talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping and several other key officials. Petro visited the state to elevate the diplomatic ties between the two countries and establish a formal strategic partnership. Although Colombia has yet to join Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, the country is the latest in a trend of South American nations seeking to strengthen their relationship with China. Colombia’s rearrangement of its foreign policy has highlighted a necessity for the United States to rejuvenate its once prominent role in Colombia and South America.

A Historic Friendship

Throughout the past two centuries, the U.S. and Colombia maintained a largely consistent and cordial relationship. In 1822, the U.S. was the second government to recognize the fledgling Gran Colombian republic. Two years later, the countries signed the Anderson-Gual Treaty, which formally established bilateral and trade relations. For the rest of the 19th century, Colombia gained quasi-protection from the U.S Monroe Doctrine, squashing any hopes of recolonization conjured by Europe’s Holy Alliance during the Metternich era. 

Relations soured with the 1903 Hay-Herran Treaty, which would have given the U.S. a 100-year lease on the isthmus of Panama. The rejection of the treaty by Colombia and domestic political instability fermented by the Thousand Days War led to the separation and subsequent independence of Panama, backed by the Theodore Roosevelt administration. The territorial usurpation established resentment within the minds of the Colombian public. Yet, Colombian politicians sought arbitration and in 1921, the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate, peacefully concluding the Panama incident. 

The settlement ushered in a new era of cooperation. The discovery of oil in 1918 made Colombia a profitable destination for various U.S. corporations, namely the United Fruit Company and the Standard Oil Company. Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy cemented a strong economic relationship, as seen with a 1936 treaty that sustained a reciprocal trade relationship. During the early 1940s, the wartime conditions introduced the beginnings of a security partnership. Colombian President Eduardo Santos Montejo promised to aid in the defense of the Panama Canal and allowed the U.S. to establish military installations on Colombian soil, even declaring war on Nazi Germany in 1943. Colombia eventually became a huge financial and military beneficiary of the Lend-Lease Act. Through the Act, Colombia was able to modernize its military while supporting the Allied cause in protecting the southern flank from Axis intrusions. The end of the war did not cease this strategic link, but rather expanded it into new realms.

Colombia was eager to showcase its support for the U.S.’s attempt to create a formal international order. It was one of the founding member states of the United Nations and hosted the first post-war Pan-American Conference in 1948, in which the Organization of American States (OAS) was inaugurated. The country would also send over 1,000 soldiers to aid the United Nations Command during the Korean War. However, the onset of the Cold War heightened Colombian domestic instability and the looming threat of communism required a greater degree of cooperation between the two countries. 

During the Pan-American Conference, presidential candidate and Liberal populist Jorge Gaitan was assassinated, immediately leading to mass riots. The riots, known as the Bogotazo, heralded the beginning of a brutal ten-year civil war between liberal and conservative factions. In 1958, a power-sharing agreement ended the war, but armed peasant groups formed Marxist and independent enclaves, known as the Marquetalia Republic, in the countryside. The success of the Cuban Revolution just a year later was a shock for U.S. national security, as communism was formally being instituted within the U.S.’s sphere of influence. To counteract the potential spread of left-wing sympathies, the Kennedy administration bolstered economic and political support in the region, with Colombia becoming a major receiver of loans from the Alliance for Progress program. Fear of replication of Fidel Castro’s success through the Marquetalia Republic prompted the U.S. to send military advisors to help Colombia formulate a plan to hinder Marxist growth. The counter-insurgency policy Plan LAZO was developed and in 1964, the Colombian military launched an assault on the enclaves. The survivors of the attack created the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to overthrow the Colombian government, officially sparking a sixty-year civil war. For the succeeding decades, the U.S. would become an institutional backbone for the Colombian government. 

As the war progressed, criminal enterprises and rebel groups expanded drug production, most notably marijuana and cocaine. Counterinsurgency was enveloped by counternarcotics, and the U.S., under the guise of Nixon’s Drug War policy to combat global drug trade networks, worked closely with Colombian domestic institutions to eradicate coca fields and cartels. Although the peak of violence during the late 1980s and 1990s came to an end with the death of Pablo Escobar and the collapse of the Medellin Cartel, conflict continued to ravage the country. To ensure that Colombia did not collapse into total chaos, the Bill Clinton and Andres Pastrana administrations created Plan Colombia, a quasi-Marshall plan that aimed at concluding the conflict by pledging military and economic aid to terminate the narco and rebel threat. Just a year later, President George W. Bush’s War on Terror added to Plan Colombia through the Andean Regional Initiative, bolstering the Colombian military. 

Nonetheless, the War on Terror transferred American national security objectives and priorities from fighting several regional Cold War threats to directly confronting terror elements in the Middle East. Over the next twenty years, issues impacting Colombia, along with most of Latin America, were back-burnered. Plan Colombia persisted as an important security measure that played a key role in Colombia’s successful offensive against the FARC and other guerrilla groups. Then in 2016, after nearly six decades of fighting and four years of negotiations, the Colombian government and FARC agreed to end the war. 

Pink Tide 

For the duration of the civil war, most of the twelve Colombian presidents maintained an amicable relationship with the United States. Occasional flare-ups arose, such as when the Clinton administration revoked Colombian President Ernesto Samper’s visa over cartel-link accusations, but the partnership never crumbled to an irredeemable level. Additionally, the Colombian political establishment remained within the center-left and right sphere; most presidents were members of the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties. Even when South America experienced a Pink Tide during the 2000s and 2010s, when several governments were controlled by left-wing leaders and parties, Colombia remained steadfast and a crucial ally of the U.S.

The Colombian public’s priorities shifted with the finalization of the 2016 Peace Agreement to end the civil war. War and absolute security no longer held primacy within the electoral mind. Corruption, economic inequality, and the reported abuses committed by the government during the war began to take precedence. The presidency of Ivan Duque, who was elected after the peace process on a right-wing platform, faced immense disapproval; his proposed political reforms and poor handling of COVID-19 sparked outrage and subsequent demonstrations were held across the country. Tens of thousands of citizens demanded the resignation of Duque, a trial of former President Alvaro Uribe for war crimes, along with the reform of various government programs. The poor economic conditions and political strife stemming from the pandemic and war polarized the Colombian public. 

 The hope for change offered controversial politician and former guerilla rebel Gustavo Petro the chance of political glory. Petro’s critique of the status-quo neoliberalism and his left-wing promises of environmental, economic, and political policy transformation made him an ideal candidate for the disillusioned population. As a result, in the 2022 general election, Gustavo Petro was elected with 50.42% of the vote, making him the first leftist president in Colombian history. 

Weakening Hemispheric Bilateralism

Akin to other leftwing South American leaders, Gustavo Petro has moved away from the sphere of the United States. Although Petro has not yet adopted a completely radical departure, such as Hugo Chavez or Evo Morales, from the historic partnership, he has been critical and even at times willing to jeopardize the relationship. Just months into his presidency, Petro announced that he would only recognize Nicolas Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela, not Juan Guaido. This was part of Petro’s wider policy of abandoning a long-standing Colombian coldness towards its unstable neighbor. Petro instead sought out to reestablish diplomatic relations with Venezuela, even reopening the border. Moreover, his Paz Total plan of ending violence by negotiating with rebel and criminal groups and granting leniency to them has been a major shift away from the traditional counternarcotics policy that the U.S. supported and approved of. 

Even with these two major policy modifications, which had once defined the U.S.-Colombian strategic partnership, Petro traveled to Washington D.C. in April of this year to meet with President Joe Biden. The two leaders found a silver-lining over climate change and environmental policy, as Petro has supported efforts to protect Colombia’s biodiversity. Nevertheless, the small moment of potential cooperation quickly dissipated over the following months, as Petro made comments denouncing U.S. foreign policy in the region, most notably the War on Drugs during a speech at the United Nations General Assembly. Recently, the division between Petro and the Biden administration hit new heights, when Petro compared Israel to Nazi Germany, receiving strong condemnation from U.S. diplomats and officials. 

Sino Influence

The growing rift between the United States and Colombia has consequently allowed China to fill up the regional hegemonic vacuum. Historically, China’s presence was minimal in Colombia. Plan Colombia and a 2012 free trade pact between the U.S. and Colombia acted as barriers against increased Chinese engagement in Latin America. As several South American countries signed onto the Belt and Road initiative, Colombia relied on its economic and political partnership with the U.S to sustain itself. Yet, with the yielding of American institutional attentiveness and care towards the region, China has aggressively picked up its pace to replace U.S. primacy. 

Since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, bilateralism between Colombia and China has grown in every direction. Between 2001 to 2014, trade exploded 35-fold. The growth of trade has been paralleled by an expansion of Chinese investment, especially towards natural resources. Within the petroleum and mining sectors, large Chinese-owned firms, such as the China National Offshore Oil Corporation and Zijin Mining Group Co, have increased resource extraction and nationwide operations.

The transportation industry and related infrastructure projects witnessed a surge in Chinese presence. In 2014, the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) won a multi-million contract to improve the 158-mile Mar 2 Highway. The bid marked the first time that a Chinese company won a PPP contract in Colombia, opening the way for other firms, including CHEC, to leverage this success and gain influence on future projects. From attempting to dredge the Magdalena River to building light rail and urban metro systems, China’s prominent role is becoming increasingly visible. 

Furthermore, China’s footprint is engulfing Colombia’s technological infrastructure. Huawei has been a dominant company in the domestic market for over 15 years, acting as the main supplier of telecommunication devices while contributing towards the development of 5G projects. Huawei has gone beyond a traditional corporation’s framework by promoting educational programs, like the Cloud Computing and Artificial Laboratory, in hopes of transforming cities into tech hubs. Alibaba and Lyft-equivalent DiDi Chuzing have also successfully made inroads into Colombian society, competing with established foreign and domestic companies like Amazon. 

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted China’s encroaching buildup. The poor healthcare system and high rates of poverty resulted in a costly mortality rate in Colombia. Desperation and necessity required then-President Duque to accept Chinese aid, which included ventilators and various other medical supplies and equipment. A mixture of Chinese community donation drives and CCP government monetary assistance elevated the Colombian public’s perception of  China. By the end of the pandemic, 76 percent of vaccines that Colombia received came from China. 

Colombian leaders, both conservative and liberal, have taken note of China’s importance and increased willingness to inject itself economically and politically. Since Alvaro Uribe’s presidency, all executive leaders have engaged in an official state visit to China. Gustavo Petro is keen to expand every dimension of Colombia’s relationship with China. His anti-U.S. rhetoric and recent travel to Beijing solidify this hope to bridge the two countries together. 

Rekindling U.S. Andean Strategy 

China’s rise in Colombia and the region has been reinforced by a lack of U.S. strategy. The dual wars in Iraq and Afghanistan anchored U.S. policymakers down, preoccupying them with counterterrorism and regime-building measures elsewhere. As the wars dragged on, the status quo unipolarity that the United States enjoyed slowly began to wither down. The desire to utilize Cold War strategy as the driving force of policy in its 21st-century relations with Latin American governments is no longer becoming viable. The last major bilateral framework between Colombia and the U.S. was President Obama’s 2016 Peace Colombia initiative. However, there have been no updates or mentions of this initiative since it was originally announced. 

With China transforming into a major adversary and the prospects of peer-to-peer conflict increasing every day, it is of utmost importance for the U.S. to restore its preeminence in Colombia and Latin America. The loss of Colombia as a major ally would be catastrophic to American security and economic interests. In the advent of a war with China, the U.S. would be exposed on its southern flank, a possibility inconceivable by American Cold War strategists and political figures. A strong Latin America framework directly intersects and supports a robust Indo-Pacific policy, especially when countering China. 

The ideal place to begin a strategic reformation would be in Colombia. The Andean nation is not a lost cause, as mentioned before, considering that Petro has not completely abandoned the U.S. The U.S. continues to be Colombia’s major trading partner, especially in terms of imports, and its soft power influence remains within public and private institutions. Rather than attempting to isolate Petro or waiting to act until a future president is slightly more pro-U.S., a current framework can utilize the leftist president to match and oppose Chinese growth.

The first step is the appointment of an ambassador. Due to partisanship plaguing the Congressional space and Biden’s unwillingness to nominate an individual to a position, the Charge d’Affaires is leading the U.S. embassy in Bogota. This debacle has been a diplomatic embarrassment, as China swiftly designated its own ambassador. But only once this technicality is removed can mutual respect and support take place. From then on, the U.S. can reestablish a strong partnership based on its interests and Petro’s ideals. Although Petro’s bombastic rhetoric might make it seem like there is zero commonality between his and Biden’s administrations, the truth is that there are various policy spaces where the two presidents can work together on.. 

Areas of Interest

Unlike his predecessors, Petro has been a staunch environmentalist and advocate for green energy, even calling on Biden to create a similar Alliance for Progress program based on renewables. When the two met in April, climate change and environmental issues were major topics of discussion. However, since then, Petro has faced multiple setbacks in following through with proposed reforms and projects. Instead of allowing Petro to succumb to his political misfortunes, the United States should use his idealism as an opportunity to push itself into the investment stage. 

For years, Colombian presidents sought electrical infrastructure deals. In 2010, Chinese company Sinohydro participated in a bid to win a contract to build a hydroelectric facility, but failed. Another Chinese firm, Yellow River, was recently successful in receiving a contract for a similar project. Now, with a president that is oriented toward renewables, Chinese companies, based on their experience, are looking to further develop themselves in this arena. State-owned PowerChina is striving to gain more contracts, such as expanding solar panel and wind projects with partners Trina Solar Energy and Three Gorges Dam Corporation. Having said that, there is still a chance for the U.S. to help update Colombia’s archaic green energy infrastructure. The U.S. has familiarity with undertaking such projects, as noted by the Export-Import Bank’s $900 million financing of solar power projects in Angola. The U.S. should take advantage of its tariff-free promotion agreement and incentivize companies and organizations to construct renewable infrastructure in Colombia, thus finding a junction where Petro can win domestic political victories while the U.S. restores itself within the country. 

Another factor is security. In the months after Petro’s inauguration, the security landscape began to quickly deteriorate. Currently, coca production is at an all-time high and armed criminal enterprises are escalating violence throughout the countryside. These factors have been a major blow to Petro’s attempted peace resolution. But, even with Petro’s strong critiques towards Plan Colombia, the U.S. continues to hold a plurality in Colombian weapon imports. 

Plan Colombia might have died a while ago, but the foundation that it laid continues to exist. Out of all the sectors in which China is seeking to enlarge itself, defense has stayed at a relatively low level. Apart from sending small quantities of equipment, the People’s Liberation Army does not have a similar connection that is shared between the U.S. military and the Colombian Armed Forces. Yet, more frequent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) institutional military visits and the sending of a military attache to Colombia signify that steps are being taken to change this. 

Petro’s proposed reforms will likely impact the traditional pillars of counternarcotics and counterterrorism, but this shouldn’t disdain American policy makers from continuing support. Already in 2022, the United States-Colombia Bicentennial Alliance Act was introduced in the U.S. Senate to strengthen the long-time security partnership. As an alternative to allowing the PLA to become Colombia’s main military backbone, the U.S. should build on the ruins of Plan Colombia and the recent Alliance Act while continuously pursuing greater military cooperation that can be adaptable to Petro’s Total Peace. 

A final and more surprising area of collaboration is Venezuela. For the past decade, Venezuela has been plagued by impotence and the lack of coherent governance. A massive humanitarian crisis has evolved and led to a mass exodus of citizens attempting to flee the country. As a result, Colombia and the U.S. have been experiencing migration waves that are at times uncontrollable and add increased stress to border and domestic institutions. A key goal of both the Biden and Petro administrations has been attempting to manage and curtail the flow of migrants. Moving away from conventional policy, officials from both countries have decided to go to the source of the problem.  

Historically, American and Colombian strategy towards Hugo Chavez and now Nicolas Maduro’s Venezuela involved pressure campaigns, typically in the form of sanctions. The hope was that Venezuela would implode and lead to the reestablishment of a formal democratic republic. With the Maduro presidency staying put and migratory waves increasing, a new plan of action was needed. In October, the Biden administration announced that they would be easing sanctions on Venezuela that included a deal for some opposition leniency for their upcoming 2024 election. Petro has taken a far more liberal approach, directly meeting with the Venezuelan despot in February and hosting world leaders for a conference in Bogota to find a solution for the political crisis taking place in the neighboring country. The policy methodologies are different, but both Biden and Petro are aiming for the same goal. The U.S. can support Petro’s regional rallying and use him as a direct link between Biden and the Venezuelan President. Perhaps Petro can also persuade Maduro to limit his own power, which would lead to the further easing of sanctions and a potentially stable future Venezuela.

Nonetheless, U.S.-Colombian relations continue to stay at a critical stage. Internal and foreign pressures are enticing U.S. officials to keep their attention elsewhere and maintain a low priority of engagement towards Colombia, along with the rest of Latin America. However, the loss of Colombia as a strategic ally and the unchecked rise of China will likely have a fatalistic consequence in the case of peer-to-peer conflict in the near future. Shared ideals and policy goals of human rights, environmental justice, democracy, climate change, and migration offer a multitude of potential cooperative projects for the Biden administration to use to restore the U.S.’s once prominent role in the country and region. If the U.S. is seeking to remove itself from a path of potential self-destruction, it has to prevent Colombia from falling into China’s sphere of influence.