Over the course of a century, America’s rise to a hegemonic status has been fueled by the threat of its ‘adversaries.’ During the Cold War, the justification of spreading American democracy abroad was to act as the ‘antithesis’ to Soviet communism. Tactics like containment, the Red Scare, and McCarthyism were not just embedded in social perceptions of foreign affairs, but in American foreign policy itself. Today, America’s antithetical adversary is China. Though the dichotomy of communism and the free world is a common denominator in both relationships, America’s rapid shift in adversaries has an uncanny Orwellian undertone: “It became known everywhere at once that Eastasia and not Eurasia was the enemy.” Similarly to previous conflicts, antagonism against China is defined by contrasts. Chinese collectivism contradicts American individualism. Chinese socialism represents authoritarianism, whereas American democratic capitalism upholds the liberal international order. In this sense, Sino-American relations are yin and yang—interconnected yet opposing forces. But yin and yang are not simply black and white; elements of one are in the other. Therefore, it is important to analyze social, economic, and political developments that have contributed to present Sino-American relations. 

China and the U.S. have the most apparent differences in their respective political regimes, particularly in the concentration of executive power. In 2017, Xi Jinping revised the Chinese Communist Party constitution, which can only be amended once every half-decade, to extend his rule indefinitely. Xi took this opportunity to cement his power by adding a paragraph to the constitution, the length of which exceeded all prior leaders. One significant detail is the section that ubiquitously describes Xi himself as the “leadership core” as opposed to the CCP as a core leadership group. Another section of the paragraph formalizes “Xi Jinping Thought,” or the idea that China can only remain strong and united under the Communist Party rule. An immediate consequence of “Xi Jinping Thought” was the Communist Party abolishing presidential term limits to strengthen and consolidate power in the Chinese government. The result confirmed Xi’s position as an unquestioned leader, facilitated lifelong rule, and made internal resistance difficult. Xi’s power grab represents an unprecedented and dangerous overreach of power, as Mao Zedong was the only other CCP leader to be named in the party’s constitution as a source of official ideology. However, China’s centralized government may be more reflective of internal regime changes than an indication of its stance towards international relationships. Thus, American concerns about China are directed towards its foreign policy agenda rather than its governmental structure.  

Despite vast political differences, economic ties have chiefly defined Sino-American relations, with the two countries acting as foundational pillars for the global economy. When China’s economy rapidly grew during the mid-to-late 20th century, America established trade relations, such as the 2000 U.S.-China Relations Act, which would later become a stabilizing feature as US-Sino relations continued to develop. The combination of opening markets and facilitating two-way exports helped accelerate economic development for both countries. In 2006, China surpassed Mexico as the United States’ second-biggest trade partner after Canada. In 2022, the U.S. trade deficit with China was 382.3 billion USD. A primary driver of this deficit is the robust Chinese manufacturing industry in conjunction with American companies’ demand for lower-cost overseas labor. Aside from economic impacts, trade can also influence social perceptions. The phrase “Made in China,” imprinted on small white stickers slapped on almost every product imaginable, has been continuously defined and redefined. For a while, consumer goods with small white labels were likely to be associated with large factory plants utilizing cheap, exploitable labor, quickly churning out thousands of mass-market products. In other words, “Made in China” has become synonymous with “poor quality.” In response, Chinese citizens and companies sought to improve the global impression of Chinese-made products to have a positive connotation. Over time, Chinese manufacturers became recognized for advanced technology as well as a consumer product powerhouse. China’s status as the world’s factory is derived from two big advantages as a manufacturing power. First, its industrial base is unparalleled in breadth and depth. China did not deprioritize its mass-consumer manufacturing industries (as online marketplaces like Temu, Alibaba, Taobao, and Pinduoduo have surged in popularity). Instead, it began to encourage corporate expansion and growth across other industries. China’s second advantage is its far-reaching market: global firms are wedded to China. During the past 18 months, the value of foreign mergers and acquisitions in China reached its highest in a decade. Analyzing bilateral trade flow statistics from the IMF database, evidence demonstrates that global trade encountered a turning point during the 2008–09 financial crisis when China overtook the U.S. as the larger trading partner for more than half of all countries. 

Due to China’s breakneck speed of economic development and mass accumulation of foreign investment, concerns about American economic dependence on China began to grow as the two countries appeared locked in a tight economic embrace. For the majority of the 20th and 21st century, the U.S. held strong positions in international institutions, from the World Trade Organization to the International Monetary Fund, because of the influence of its large economy. Anxiety is centered around China using its newfound economic strength to displace the US’s status as an international hegemon and China’s potential ability to hold leverage over the U.S. As a result, American politicians have resorted to casting China as an economic and ideological foe to push their own policy agendas, which–by happenstance–has become a rare area of bipartisan consensus. Policymakers have used this concern and threat to American superiority as a focus in campaigns, promising to boost domestic private industries and prioritize American job growth. This could be the telltale signs of a Thucydides trap—the theory that transitions in power dynamics inevitably lead to conflict as the current power resists displacement and the emerging power thrusts itself into the global arena. China is the emerging power of the 21st century, and economic analysts are unsure of the US’s role in the next few decades. 

A major concern is China’s tendency to use economic coercion as a tool to shape policies or signal its disapproval. Political economist Albert O. Hirschman writes that economic interdependence can be used as a means of political pressure and leverage because it is typically composed of asymmetric relationships: one country’s economy depends on the other’s, but not vice versa. China has historically reacted to perceived slights with economic retaliation against weaker, dependent economies. For example, to signal its disapproval of Seoul’s decision to deploy the American THAAD anti-missile system in 2017, the Chinese government implicitly supported a domestic boycott of South Korean goods. When Lithuania opened a “Taiwan” representative office (as opposed to China’s preferred title of “Chinese Taipei”), China implemented draconian trade measures such as closing credit lines for Lithuanian companies and blocking imports of orders from China. The willingness of countries to sign up for supply chain coalitions or to support Taiwan’s defense depends on how fearful they are of Chinese economic retaliation, as no country can truly decouple from one of the largest economies in the world. 

Another driver of the concern with Chinese economic coercion is the landmark Belt and Road Initiative (known in China as One Belt, One Road, or 一带一路). Launched in 2013, China began promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a development project that will establish an interconnected infrastructure network across Eurasia. With massive sustainable energy, transportation, and technology initiatives, countries across sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and the European Union have eagerly signed on to the BRI, totaling a whopping 40% of global GDP. But with massive projects come massive loans, leading some experts to worry that BRI projects contain hidden debt traps. Analysts fear two outcomes. The first scenario is that a country signs onto a BRI project with an opaque bidding process and pays for the project at an inflated cost. While Chinese loan tenures are often shorter with higher interest rates, this may be an outcome of risk-taking by Chinese banks rather than intentionally predatory loans. The second scenario is that a country struggling to repay debt consigns strategic assets to China to relieve the burden. A similar situation occurred when Sri Lanka, on the brink of a debt default, signed over the Hambantota port to Chinese ownership for 99 years. In the latter view, American analysts are skeptical about China’s lucrative promises of economic development and believe the BRI could be a Trojan horse for China to expand soft power over contested regions through debt-trap diplomacy. However, the United States or its economic partners have yet to offer a competitive alternative to the BRI. Neither Trump’s BUILD Act nor Biden’s Build Back Better World Initiative received serious financial support, and especially not to the same degree that China pours funding into the BRI. For countries that want help financing infrastructure development, criticism from the West rings hollow. 

Aside from political concerns about the BRI creating a new Sinocentric world order, it is also important to evaluate the relative success of individual BRI projects. Over the course of a decade, cumulative BRI investment has amounted to 962 billion USD, including completed projects like Indonesia’s Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway and in-progress transportation and power projects in Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Nigeria. IMF reports indicate that these countries are in sound shape, and that borrowing from China is integrated into their overall debt and budget management. However, China’s slowing economy, unsustainable funding practices, and contribution to increasing debt burdens on developing countries cannot be discounted. At the same time, it is impractical to expect perfection from a global infrastructure project, and criticism should be directed towards improving progress in regional connectivity rather than focusing solely on geopolitics. 

In terms of military diplomacy, the United States has avoided ‘poking the dragon’ by maintaining its five-decade-long One China policy in regards to Taiwan. Basic elements include recognizing the PRC as the sole legal government of China, “acknowledging,” but not accepting, the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China, and expecting cross-Strait differences to be resolved peacefully. While neither China nor Taiwan were completely satisfied with these terms, tensions remained relatively stable, with the U.S. able to cooperate on both sides. However, as uncompromising and inflammatory rhetoric about reunification with Taiwan began to surge in China, some political scientists warned that Sino-American relations could be drifting toward a security dilemma. Originating in the Obama administration, the U.S. responded with a ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy, which had not been fully realized until the late Biden administration. The Pivot policy aims to contain China’s influence and concentrate U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic resources in the Pacific hemisphere. Despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration has continued to prioritize China as the most consequential strategic challenge of the U.S.; Russia, by comparison, is considered the “acute” and short-term threat. 

However, other political scientists insist that policies like the ‘Pivot to Asia’ comprise threat rhetoric and create more of a problem than they solve. Despite warnings about military dominance, China has refrained from massive interventions, invasions, or occupations since 1979. At present, Xi displays little sense of urgency about realizing unification with Taiwan via military means, and there is no indication of a massive military buildup in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait. Most discussions about Chinese aggression worry about rhetoric, not actions. Yet, China may still be inclined to respond to what it perceives as American encroachment in its region of influence. Alliances like the Quad and AUKUS have encouraged major actors like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam to bolster military and diplomatic relations with the U.S. and reduce ties to China. Thus, a Chinese military buildup could be interpreted from the perspective of defensive realism—that China is responding to American provocation and not acting out of sheer aggression. Ultimately, both countries believing the other is acting offensively creates a dangerous feedback loop, which could eventually escalate to a military confrontation. 

Western academia also has a fundamental role in influencing these economic, political, and diplomatic policies, as pervasive Orientalist attitudes towards the “East” have painted China as an existential danger to the Western world. Political scientists Miwa Hirono and Shogo Suzuki’s research on ‘Myth-Busting’ reveals that studies of China’s international relations serve Western national security agendas and are rooted in the colonial need to control non-Western people. Edward Said, author of Orientalism, states that the purpose of Orientalism was to “understand, even manipulate, a manifestly different world.” As a result, Western research framed China as an example of failed development toward the implicit goal of liberal democracy. However, China’s antipathy toward liberal democratic governance made it a threat to Western interests, which influenced researchers to conclude that China’s primary foreign policy objective was challenging U.S. hegemony. This relationship between the academic and national security agendas in the West suggests that remnants of imperialist notions such as the “Yellow Peril” inform our present-day understandings of China as the “enemy.” Unfortunately, such ideas are so deeply rooted in our culture that most policy analysts are inclined to feed ‘common sense’ back into the system and hide behind a notion of ‘objectivity.’ 

Yin and yang are not perfectly divided; in international relations, human nature and subjectivity have made it impossible for issues to be clearly divided. Viewing the world through a simple black-and-white lens leads to reductive understandings of foreign relationships. Instead, we need to shift our perceptions to acknowledge the nuance and multifaceted dimension of international relations and avoid reducing foreign affairs to politically convenient sound bytes. While there are valid criticisms of China about its authoritarian government and lack of transparency, that does not entail automatically assuming Chinese foreign diplomacy has malicious intentions. Not all that appears to be a threat is truly a threat, and not all that appears democratic is truly democratic. In establishing itself as the contrast to China, America limits opportunities for global interconnectivity and fosters competition over cooperation. 

To form more effective foreign policies, we need to rethink and question existing conceptions of security. In her critical analysis of Middle Eastern regional security, Pinar Bilgin stresses the importance of becoming aware of the relationship between representation and practice. To label a geographic area as “Western” or “Eastern” is not only to name it, but to brand it with preconceived biases. Thus, human agency and self-reflection play an important role in shaping the past and producing a better future—we must work to reorient our conceptions of the Orient.